Not every film icon gets legal protection. On May 27, 2025, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Eleanor—the legendary Mustang from the Gone in 60 Seconds film franchise—is not a copyrightable character. In Carroll Shelby Licensing, Inc. v. Halicki, — F.4th —-, 2025 WL 1499052 (9th Cir. 2025), the court hit the brakes on efforts to protect the car under copyright law.
The decision draws a sharp distinction between pop culture props and protectable characters. A decade after the court gave the Batmobile copyright protection, it declined to do the same for Eleanor, clarifying that nostalgia, branding, and screen time are not enough.
An “Eleanor” Mustang appeared in four films spanning over 25 years: the original Gone in 60 Seconds (1974), The Junkman (1982), Deadline Auto Theft (1983), and the 2000 remake Gone in 60 Seconds starring Nicolas Cage. Each film featured a Mustang dubbed “Eleanor,” and used it in dramatic chase scenes, but its appearance varied significantly across the films, ranging from a yellow-and-black Fastback to a gray Shelby GT-500 and even a rusted-out shell. While Eleanor was always the final heist target, her identity was anything but consistent.
After the 2000 remake, Shelby licensed GT-500 Mustangs styled after Eleanor. Halicki, who held rights in the earlier films and claimed merchandising rights, sued for copyright infringement. The case ultimately turned on whether Eleanor was a protectable character.
The Ninth Circuit applied DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015), in which it found that the Batmobile qualified as a copyrightable character. The Towle test requires:
Eleanor stalled on all three prongs.
The contrast is clear. The Batmobile had consistent bat-themed visuals, high-tech gadgets, and a narrative role as Batman’s loyal (and sometimes autonomous) sidekick. Eleanor lacked that coherence and those defining characteristics, making her more akin to a film prop.
The Halicki decision underscores that the mere recurrence of a named object—even across multiple films and carrying significant nostalgia or brand recognition—is not enough for “character” protection under copyright law, and means:
Replica builders, manufacturers, and merchandisers may see this ruling as a win. It curbs overreach by IP holders claiming exclusive rights to stylized props without character development.
When the law sets limits, contracts may fill the gap. Parties can try to:
In Carroll Shelby v. Halicki, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that copyright law protects expression, not iconography. Eleanor may be famous, but she’s not a character in the eyes of the law.
For creators, studios, and counsel, the lesson is clear: define what you are protecting, give it depth, and use contracts to fill gaps where copyright protection may stop short.
Patrick Ross, Senior Manager of Marketing & Communications
EmailP: 619.906.5740
Suzie Jayyusi, Events Planner
EmailP: 619.525.3818